Legislature(1997 - 1998)
04/29/1997 01:05 PM House JUD
| Audio | Topic |
|---|
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
HB 234 - ABORTIONS UNDER GENERAL RELIEF PROGRAM CHAIRMAN GREEN announced the first order of business was House Bill No. 234, "An Act relating to assistance for abortions under the general relief program; and relating to financial responsibility for the costs of abortions." He acknowledged the presence of the sponsor, Representative Martin, and advised members that although testimony had been closed previously, Kristen Bomengen had been unavoidably absent and would therefore be testifying. Number 0079 KRISTEN BOMENGEN, Assistant Attorney General, Human Services Section, Civil Division (Juneau), Department of Law, came forward to testify, specifying that she is the supervising attorney of the Human Services Section. MS. BOMENGEN noted that Deborah Behr had addressed one constitutional issue quite adequately at the April 25 hearing; that issue arises because the effect of this bill is to cut off funding for abortions under the general relief medical program by placing abortion services first on the list of procedures (to be eliminated). MS. BOMENGEN said in their analysis, that is likely to be found unconstitutional because in states offering higher privacy protections, state courts have found that when a state elects to offer pregnancy-related services, it needs to do so in a "constitutionally neutral" manner. "And under our privacy protections, in our state, we find it likely that our court would find the same," Ms. Bomengen added. She described that as the first level of inquiry into the constitutional issues. MS. BOMENGEN said, however, that if the funding status changed and abortion services were made available - or if this bill were successfully challenged in court, with a resulting determination that the state had to make those services available - that would trigger other parts of this bill, the issues of recovery of funding and responsibility for repayment to the state, giving rise to another level of constitutional problems. MS. BOMENGEN explained that in this case, the woman would be required to provide the name of her sexual partner, with the express intent on the part of the state to inform that sexual partner that the woman had received an abortion. Ms. Bomengen said there are many reasons why a woman may not want that individual to know. And although this law provides for a good-cause exception, that may have to cover a broad range; there may be many repercussions that would be an invasion of that individual's privacy, such as simply revealing the fact to family and friends or publicizing it in some way with an intent to humiliate. MS. BOMENGEN stated, "And so, the U.S. Supreme Court has talked not to this particular issue - I wasn't able to find any other state laws that addressed it in quite this way - but the Supreme Court has spoken to spousal notification issues. And even in the case of a spousal notification requirement, where arguably a spouse ... would have reasons to have that kind of private information, the court has found that it's unconstitutional to require that a spouse be informed of the procedure. So, we think it highly unlikely that the court in our state, again, would allow us to make the provision of services contingent upon the requirement that she identify her sexual partner." MS. BOMENGEN acknowledged that this may be somewhat confusing because the state requires a woman who has a child and is seeking services on behalf of that child to identify a sexual partner, the father of the child. However, in that case, the state is in the position of supporting that child otherwise and is able to show a compelling interest in identifying a responsible parent to provide that support. MS. BOMENGEN pointed out that that compelling interest would not be present here in that same way, since the state would only be seeking to recover the minimal expense of the procedure. Furthermore, the state already has a provision in place to recover that cost from the woman's permanent fund dividend (PFD). Ms. Bomengen concluded, "And so, it seems unlikely that this would withstand a constitutional challenge as well, again, on privacy grounds. And so, there is a reason to distinguish this kind of a requirement, contingency of services that would require the naming of a sexual partner, from the services in other instances where there is a long-term support ... going to a child." Number 0484 REPRESENTATIVE CON BUNDE indicated he was troubled about the difference between the state's compelling right in a live birth and in this instance. He requested clarification about the process and expense of recovering the money from the male involved in an aborted pregnancy. He added that obviously, he was concerned about a net gain for the state, not a net loss. Number 0583 MS. BOMENGEN replied that she was not exactly certain of the figures for the costs. However, in this bill, the state would be required to file an independent action in order to establish that claim before even going after a PFD, for example. Given the estimated cost of the procedure itself, it was likely that the time involved in filing and pursuing a complaint would exceed the recovery to be received directly from the individual. Even where they could collect attorneys' fees, it was unlikely that they would collect anything to really equal the costs in time and energy. Furthermore, there would be additional costs if the case were contested in some way so that blood testing or other testing became necessary; those costs could conceivably be recovered. Ms. Bomengen emphasized that the costs of pursuing these recoveries would probably exceed the actual recoveries by the state. Number 0658 REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE mentioned preserving evidence from a legal standpoint, then said it boggles the mind. Number 0685 REPRESENTATIVE BRIAN PORTER referred to the constitutional problem relating to the state's provision for privacy. He asked what Ms. Bomengen's feeling would be on that if the requirement to name the father were to be eliminated. MS. BOMENGEN replied, "That would eliminate that particular element of the constitutional vulnerability of the bill. ... And that comes at the point where we're making services contingent upon the naming. So, that would remove that privacy invasion, so to speak." She pointed out that the previous issue of virtually cutting off funding would remain, however. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER suggested that it would not be as a violation of the privacy act. MS. BOMENGEN said that previous provision is vulnerable as a challenge to privacy considerations. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER requested clarification. MS. BOMENGEN explained, "That goes to ... the tests that have been applied in other states that have explicit privacy protections, that when a state elects to provide pregnancy-related services, and out of an acknowledgment that some kind of medical procedure is necessary in any pregnancy-related service, that it must provide those services in a `constitutionally neutral,' manner, so to speak, so that they would not necessarily impose upon the decision ... of whether that woman could choose, under her constitutionally protected right to choose, whether to terminate that pregnancy." MS. BOMENGEN continued, "And so, it's based on some other state cases in which that has been the finding, again, based on either constitutional privacy protections in those state constitutions or in an analysis that holds individual rights in high regard, which is also something we find in our state constitutional analysis." REPRESENTATIVE PORTER asked: If it were legal but the state did not have the money to pay for it, did those decisions say that the state would have to provide the money to pay for it? Number 0844 MS. BOMENGEN replied that in this case, the area in which it is vulnerable and capable of being challenged under the constitution is the matter of separating out abortion services from other pregnancy-related services, so that abortion services are listed as the first item (for elimination) but other pregnancy-related services are offered. REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE asked whether for the state to legally be able to not provide abortion services, it would have to not provide any pregnancy-related services. MS. BOMENGEN said that was essentially it. She explained that if the state was going to provide services in this area to people who don't have funds to provide them for themselves, it was inappropriate to use the means of separating out one from another in order to affect a constitutionally protected right. Number 0933 REPRESENTATIVE TERRY MARTIN, sponsor, wrapped up by touching on numerous issues, including the state's attitude on abortion; fiscal restraints; the Governor's saying that senior citizens are being deprived of funds for emergency dental care and children are being deprived of eyeglasses, both lower priorities than elective abortions; and making the father responsible for abortion costs as well as live births, especially in cases of rape or incest. REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN continued, saying he found illogical the arguments by the Department of Law, which he believed were red herrings. He mentioned controversy in some states over disclosure of sexual partners in order to stop venereal disease, and he said in many cases, those individuals were charged for the medical services. Number 1074 REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN mentioned the constitutionality of the right to abortions. He said there are many laws for which the state expends no money. "It's not that we're not appropriating money for it," he said. "We're finding another source of financing it. And yes, we do limit that amount of money that goes to general relief medicine to complement the federal money from Medicaid (indisc.) allow for abortions." He noted that senior citizens, under new legislation, are asked to give some money for their prescriptions and eyeglasses; they pay partially now for the services of Medicaid and/or general relief medical services. He restated his belief that the constitutional issue of privacy is a red herring, saying, "in many cases, for our freedoms, we do pay the bill; the government does not pay for it." REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN said he believes only nine states pay for abortions, and he does not know whether that is partly funded by patients or their partners. He said that a federal law had been copied for the child support enforcement act. Noting that these abortion procedures are elective, he asked: Why not let someone else pay for them? REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN concluded, "So, I'd rather test it in court, to see if the legislators are in charge of the funding. The same way like the prisons. The court charged us and said we're going to fine you, every year now, for overcrowded prisons. Okay, fine us. We don't fund it. ... We didn't put it back in the prisons account, where they want the money. We take it out of DNR and roll it back in and pay it again. So, we were not paying for what the court demands that we will pay for. And it's very clear that we, the legislators, have the final authority on appropriations. And in this case, we're only seeking ... the partner to pay for the abortion." REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN referred to a prior hearing's testimony and indicated the most important thing is that this will cause about 80 percent of the children to live. He commented, "Wonderful. Hallelujah. Five hundred and ninety lives saved in one bill. That's what I love." He said he did not particularly care what the costs were. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER asked whether public testimony was concluded. CHAIRMAN GREEN indicated that although one person had called in, testimony already had been closed except for Ms. Bomengen, who had had a prior obligation. Number 1357 REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE stated his understanding that currently the state does not require a woman receiving a state-funded abortion to contribute to the expense via her PFD but that this bill would require it. REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN affirmed that, adding, "Or the partner." Number 1376 REPRESENTATIVE ERIC CROFT asked whether it was Representative Martin's position that if a court were to find that this bill violates Alaska women's right to privacy or other constitutional provisions and ordered the legislature to fund these, the legislature should refuse. REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN responded, "Number one, I believe in separation of the various three major bodies. I don't want to say what the court will or will not do. I can see where the Administration, on many cases that we have before us, will bring up the court. Everything we do, almost, you know, has been unconstitutional, no matter what the bill is. And so, we as legislators, in our best judgment, go forth with what we think is proper and that would serve the public purpose. Later on, if we find it doesn't, ... then we have to adjust it accordingly. But I don't want to anticipate what the court will do. I don't want to even let that be a reason for supporting or [being] against the bill." Number 1438 REPRESENTATIVE NORMAN ROKEBERG announced that he had three amendments. He offered Amendment 1, 0-LS0848\B.3, Lauterbach, 4/18/97, which read: Page 2, line 7, through page 3, line 10: Delete all material and insert: "Sec. 47.25.205. Priority of general relief medical assistance. If the department finds that the cost of medical assistance for all persons eligible under AS 47.25.120 - 47.25.300 will exceed the amount allocated in the state budget for that assistance for the fiscal year, the department shall eliminate coverage for medical services in the following order: (1) abortions where the pregnancy did not result from rape or incest and related services and supplies, such as medical supplies and equipment, transportation, laboratory and x-ray services, physician services, hospital services, and pharmaceuticals, used for an abortion where the pregnancy did not result from rape or incest; (2) treatment of speech, hearing, and language disorders; (3)[(2)] optometrists' services and eyeglasses; (4)[(3)] occupational therapy; (5)[(4)] emergency dental services for adults; (6)[(5)] prosthetic devices not including dentures; (7)[(6)] medical supplies and equipment other than those used to perform an abortion described in (1) of this section; (8)[(7)] physical therapy; (9)[(8)] outpatient laboratory and outpatient x-ray services other than those used for an abortion described in (1) of this section; (10)[(9)] ambulatory surgical center services other than services to perform an abortion described in (1) of this section; (11)[(10)] nonemergency medical transportation other than transportation to obtain an abortion described in (1) of this section; (12)[(11)] outpatient physician services other than services to perform an abortion described in (1) of this section; (13)[(12)] outpatient hospital services other than services to perform an abortion described in (1) of this section; (14)[(13)] intermediate care facility services; (15)[(14)] skilled nursing facility services; (16)[(15)] emergency medical transportation other than transportation for an abortion described in (1) of this section; (17)[(16)] pharmaceuticals other than those used in an abortion described in (1) of this section; (18)[(17)] inpatient physician services other than services to perform an abortion described in (1) of this section; (19)[(18)] inpatient hospital services other than services to perform an abortion described in (1) of this section." REPRESENTATIVE ETHAN BERKOWITZ objected for discussion purposes. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said it provides exceptions for instances of rape and incest, which he believes would be consistent with testimony regarding federal and state laws, as well as being consistent with the remainder of the bill. Number 1513 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked how it would be determined whether the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest if the woman did not choose to disclose how it occurred. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he would leave that to "the department and the peculiarities of the circumstances." If there were a rape or incest, he believed that law enforcement officers would be involved and the evidence needed by the department would be provided. Number 1556 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked, "In the contingency where the woman's shame prevents her from disclosing what has happened, what would we be doing here? Would we be compelling her to relate a story or compelling her to hide the truth?" REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG suggested it would be a matter of choice. Number 1580 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT noted that this conforms with every related service, including medical transportation and pharmaceutical services. CHAIRMAN GREEN said those are in existing law. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG indicated the amendment was drafted by their legal counsel, upon whom he would rely. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said he understood why it was drafted that way. However, it troubled him that the woman may have to disclose that this was the result of rape or incest every step of the way, including before being allowed on an ambulance, for example. CHAIRMAN GREEN suggested if they wanted compensation, there would be disclosure. Otherwise, there would not be. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said his answer was "ditto." CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether the objection was maintained. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said yes. CHAIRMAN GREEN requested a roll call vote. Voting for Amendment 1 were Representatives Bunde, Rokeberg and Green. Voting against it were Representatives Porter, Croft and Berkowitz. Representative James was absent. Therefore, Amendment 1 failed, 3 to 3. Number 1730 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG offered Amendment 2, 0-LS0848\B.4, Lauterbach, 4/26/97, which read: Page 1, line 5, following "costs.": Insert "(a)" Page 1, following line 7: Insert a new subsection to read: "(b) A parent or legal guardian of a minor liable under (a) of this section for the medical costs of an abortion is also liable for the medical costs of the abortion unless the department determines that a statutory or constitutional right of confidentiality would be infringed by a disclosure to the parent or guardian that the abortion had occurred." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG explained that Amendment 2 provides that the parent or legal guardian can be found liable for the medical costs of an abortion, unless the revelation of the abortion would impinge on the statutory or constitutional right of confidentiality of the patient. Referring to earlier discussion of confidentiality and privacy, he stated his belief that this is in the spirit of maintaining that confidentiality, particularly as it relates to the department's endeavor to get reimbursement and/or require a payment by the parent or legal guardian for the procedure. Number 1776 CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether this would apply to the parents or legal guardians of both the pregnant woman and the male involved. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG at first said it was the parents of the female, then added that it also could be the parents of the father, which is the way it is drafted. REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE noted that in legislation previously passed through this committee, the parent of the female would be required to give permission, at certain ages, to have the abortion. He asked whether the parent of the female, then, by having granted this permission, would not assume greater liability. CHAIRMAN GREEN suggested that since subsection (a) says both are equally liable, the parents of both would also be liable with this amendment. Number 1837 REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE stated, "Parents A give permission for a procedure that costs money. Parents B had no input in that decision, and yet we're going to ... assess them both for the cost. And, again, by the time we go through the whole process, ... it'll have cost us more than we would have gained. But, you see, I have some problem there." CHAIRMAN GREEN replied, "Well, I think the attachment there would be the fact that if ... mother A and father B are both minors, and they have a responsibility but they can't afford it. So, the parents of mother now [are] liable for a portion of the cost. And if it exceeds, because of some complications, then the parents of B, who is also responsible, it seems to me would be, under this amendment, be equally liable for the actions of their children. But they had no decision, I agree, the male side." Number 1887 REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE noted that previous legislation had said that for a child brought to term, the parents of the child's father had equal financial responsibility, along with the parents of the child's mother. CHAIRMAN GREEN said he believed there would be parallel responsibility with this amendment. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG commented that he couldn't disagree with anything either Chairman Green or Representative Bunde had said. Number 1912 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT asked whether the parents of the unborn child's father, who had no right to influence the decision regarding abortion, were liable under this section for the medical costs. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said that is correct. CHAIRMAN GREEN agreed. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT noted that it says "of a minor." He stated his understanding that if it was an older man with a young woman, that man's parents would not be liable. Number 1960 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he had not thought through that scenario. He stated, "But I think the language is tight enough that it would allow that the minor being liable under ... subsection (a) above, it would be her parents or legal guardian. If there was a person of the age of majority, then they would not be." CHAIRMAN GREEN agreed that was the way he would read it. He asked whether that was Representative Rokeberg's intent. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG responded, "Yeah, I mean, that's fine, because I -- you know, it does lead to a troublesome-type of analysis in the field, as a practical application. But, I mean, that would be one way to do the demarcation, as to the majority of the individuals involved." CHAIRMAN GREEN noted that Anne Carpeneti from the Department of Law was present. He asked what would happen if the father was a minor at the time of consummation but came of age by the time the abortion occurred. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG suggested that the proximate cause would be ascribed to the time of the occurrence. Number 2031 CHAIRMAN GREEN, after Ms. Carpeneti deferred to Ms. Bomengen, specified that the concerns regarding Amendment 2 were whether (b) would attach a liability to the parents of both the minor father and mother of the aborted child, and what would happen if that father was not a minor or came of age between the conception and the abortion. MS. BOMENGEN responded, "It appears as though the intent is certainly to require that the parents of both minors would be liable, and that appears as though that's what the language is doing here. I believe we would have some legal questions to argue about when it comes to someone who transitions that, minority to majority. So, I would imagine there'd be different ways that it could be read, and it would have to be worked out." CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether Ms. Bomengen believed for a man who was not a minor at the time of conception, this wording would exclude his parents. MS. BOMENGEN replied that this clearly says a parent or legal guardian of a minor. CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether the objection was maintained. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said yes. CHAIRMAN GREEN requested a roll call vote. Voting for Amendment 2 were Representatives Rokeberg and Green. Voting against it were Representatives Bunde, Porter, Croft and Berkowitz. Representative James was absent. Therefore, Amendment 2 failed, 4 to 2. Number 2163 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG offered Amendment 3, 0-LS0848\B.5, Lauterbach, 4/26/97, which read: Page 1, line 7, following "child.": Insert "The liability established under this section may not be enforced if enforcement would violate a statutory or constitutional right of confidentiality related to abortion decisions." Page 4, following line 6: Insert a new bill section to read: "* Sec. 7. AS 47.25 is amended by adding a new section to read: Sec. 47.25.267. Protection of confidentiality. Notwithstanding AS 47.25.150, 47.25.220, and 47.25.240, the department may not implement AS 47.25.150, 47.25.220, or 47.25.240 to the extent that implementation would violate a statutory or constitutional right of confidentiality related to abortion decisions." Renumber the following bill section accordingly. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG advised members that Amendment 3 again speaks to the issue of confidentiality, especially important in light of the existing consent law and any "moving bill that speaks to consent." It relates to shielding a young woman from any revelations to a family member that may be harmful to her well- being. He asked for unanimous consent. Number 2228 REPRESENTATIVE PORTER said he would speak against the amendment and stated, "I guess perhaps to explain the position on all these amendments, I basically don't think it's appropriate to try to put a dress on a nag and come up with a thoroughbred, because I don't think this bill can ever be put in that position." REPRESENTATIVE PORTER continued, "But notwithstanding that, this particular provision, while I understand its intent, would just basically make absolutely a requirement that the provisions of the bill would go to court and have to be determined whether they do or do not violate a constitutional right of, in this case, privacy, I presume. I don't think we should write a statute that demands that there be a supreme court decision before it could go into effect." REPRESENTATIVE CROFT objected on much the same grounds, adding that he did not want to employ more lawyers with this. Number 2270 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG took exception to the statement that this would necessitate a legal judgment by the state supreme court. He said it is clear, black-and-white language, adding, "And the provisions in our constitution and our statutes are such that, I think, that the rights of the individual should be protected, and I think this speaks to that provision." REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said it seemed that it would require litigation, unless they were giving authority to the department to just ignore those portions of this statute that someone in the department feels would violate it. He stated, "I think both of them are equally unpalatable, one, delegating that sort of judicial determination to the department, the other, requiring that it be litigated. So, ... I apologize for being flippant on it, but I do think it either requires it or is making a somewhat unusual delegation to the department." Number 2337 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG suggested perhaps the issues of Amendment 3 should be separated, because that was not his intention. He said the objection he was hearing was that the department's judgment would be taken up on the second portion. He asked Representative Croft for a response. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT stated, "I said that it's objectionable to me either way." He stated his belief that it would require judicial enforcement; if not, it would require departmental enforcement. He guessed the former was preferable. However, he believed that both provisions do the same thing. He concluded, "I would assume that they mean judicial determination of statutory or constitutional infirmity, not department. So, I'm not operating under that assumption, and that's why I do think it will have to be litigated." REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he would still ask for consideration of the amendment, stating that the intention is the paramount issue here as to the constitutional and statutory rights being protected. CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether Representative Rokeberg was suggesting dividing the question. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said no. CHAIRMAN GREEN requested a roll call vote. Voting for Amendment 3 were Representatives Rokeberg and James. Voting against it were Representatives Bunde, Porter, Croft, Berkowitz and Green. Therefore, Amendment 3 failed, 5 to 2. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to rescind the committee's action on Amendment 1. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER objected. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he believed Amendment 1 should be reconsidered in light of the fact that the intention was to provide further rights to victims of rape and incest, to ensure that they are able to get an abortion. [Representative Porter's comments cut off by tape change] TAPE 97-70, SIDE B Number 0006 REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said his objection had been partly to the substance. He did not believe that inquiry was warranted for the actual abortion service, and he certainly did not believe it was warranted at every stage of the proceeding. It compounded in his mind a fundamental fallacy, that a woman must disclose and justify it before obtaining this medical procedure. CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether that was an objection or was being offered as a friendly amendment. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT said it was an objection. Number 0046 REPRESENTATIVE JEANNETTE JAMES apologized for having arrived late. She suggested that rather than having to make this disclosure at each stage, a woman would disclose it once to the department and then qualify for those services. Number 0081 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ agreed that would be true if the woman chose to make the disclosure. "But what we're doing here is requiring her to make a disclosure," he stated. "And to me, that's invasive of her privacy on that issue, not even getting to the privacy attached to abortion. It's the issue of whether she has a right to remain silent." Number 0099 REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE stated his understanding that for rape or incest to exist for disclosure purposes under the bill, there must have been a criminal trial and a finding, rather than someone asking for an abortion and saying a rape occurred. He asked whether that was correct. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER replied, "Well, I think the work that's been done throughout the state over the last 15-20 years has led to a realization that there are fewer and fewer females who find themselves personally afraid of going forward with a prosecution of rape or incest. There are still those who do. And this is precisely, in my mind, what the right to privacy is all about." Number 0157 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to a document from the Department of Health and Social Services, received that day (copy in packets), the last page of which is entitled "Report on Claims of Good Cause for Refusing to Cooperate in Establishing Paternity and Securing Child Support." It indicates that from 4/1/96 to 9/30/96, there was one instance of conception resulting from incest or forcible rape out of 26 claims (of good cause) during that period. Representative Rokeberg said the amendment is consistent with the federal requirements, both in terms of the case law and the regulations, and he did not understand the debate. Number 0188 REPRESENTATIVE JAMES stated that Representative Bunde's comment made a lot of sense because of the time issue. She said, "But also, what Representative Rokeberg said, then why in the world do they even have that language in there? Does that mean that if you went and had an abortion and only could do it under rape and incest, and then after the abortion is already done, you go to court and you find out whether or not it was okay that you did it?" REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said she believes there is a lot of inconsistency with "decisions that have been handed down to the court." She would like to put as much as possible on the table for them to decide. Otherwise, they would never have those answers. CHAIRMAN GREEN asked how long a trial might take. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER said 120 days. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said that would be stretched out because of discovery. A rape trial itself would take at least one or two weeks. CHAIRMAN GREEN suggested that might take five or six months. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER clarified that it is 120 days from the time of arrest or indictment. For a "stranger rape" involving an unidentified perpetrator, it could be much longer. Number 0262 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said he did not believe there needed to be a fully adjudicated finding in this case; it did not make sense. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ suggested if there was a false allegation of rape or incest, the abortion would be performed and somebody's name would be besmirched who could not come back and clear it. All kinds of problems may result from just the call of rape or incest, including determining whether it is true and then proceeding accordingly. Noting that this bill had been put forward with the idea of being fiscally responsible, he said, "To invade that thicket invites all kinds of costs." CHAIRMAN GREEN requested a roll call vote. Voting to rescind the previous action on Amendment 1 were Representatives Rokeberg, James and Green. Voting against it were Representatives Bunde, Porter, Croft and Berkowitz. Therefore, the motion failed, 4 to 3. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to rescind the previous action on Amendment 2. CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether the reason was that an additional committee member was present. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG said yes. CHAIRMAN GREEN asked whether there was discussion and requested a roll call vote, saying he assumed there was an objection. An unidentified speaker affirmed the objection. Voting to rescind the previous action on Amendment 2 were Representatives Rokeberg, James and Green. Voting against it were Representatives Bunde, Porter, Croft and Berkowitz. Therefore, the motion failed, 4 to 3. CHAIRMAN GREEN announced that the original bill was again before the committee. Number 0359 REPRESENTATIVE PORTER stated that he respected the intent of the sponsor and cosponsors. Although the discussion on the privacy argument had left him a bit confused, that was not the reason that he would not support this legislation. And while he also believed that naming the father had merit, the cost and time involved in trying to reach a conclusion to that end, including possible DNA analyses and so forth, caused him some concern for "cruel-and- unusual and also just plain it-doesn't-pencil-out." Additionally, he understood the intent of the proposed amendments, and had he seen some ability to make the bill function to his principles, he probably would have supported them. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER recalled another bill before the committee a few years earlier, which he had believed was appropriate and which would have done the reverse of this, eliminating some regulations. He stated that the "folks that would qualify for this kind of a procedure are precisely the folks that need it, that need to have that availability to avoid what I have seen personally happen when all of this was against the law, back-room abortions. And I will never vote for a piece of legislation that would return us to that era. For that reason, I will be voting `no' on this bill." Number 0456 REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said her only concern in the bill is the issue of the involvement of the man. She recalled how in high school, there had been pregnant girls, with the "guy just going off on his merry way." She believes it is unfair for the woman to take the blame for something for which she is only half responsible. She expressed interest in finding a way to have a level playing field for the man and the woman. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said she understands the woman's right to privacy; she supposes that if a woman chooses to take the whole responsibility for the pregnancy, that is her choice. However, the law should provide the option of involving the male from the beginning. Representative James said she would go so far as to say it is important for the male to even be involved in the decision of whether to carry the child or abort it, because it is half his. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES expressed reservations about whether the bill should go anywhere, saying that they had not determined all of the intended or unintended consequences and that "it's a little premature and not correctly written." However, she wanted to put on record her belief that when a choice is made to enter into the act that causes a pregnancy, both parties should share that responsibility equally, however that is accomplished. Number 0567 REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE said he would like to "associate his comments with the previous two speakers." He said he had serious concerns about the constitutionality of the bill and yet would very much appreciate a vehicle that would require personal responsibility of the male. He restated a comment from a previous hearing, about a man who bragged of having sired 19 children by 11 different women. Representative Bunde said that although he wanted to have that man be financially responsible, at the least, he did not see that happening under HB 234. Referring to previous legislation, he said the practicality of preserving evidence for future DNA tests and having a data bank, for example, was fiscally insurmountable. REPRESENTATIVE BUNDE said he believed the issue deserved debate and further study, and he would not stand in the way if the committee wished to move the bill for those purposes. "But I could not vote for this bill in its present form, should it come to the floor," he concluded. Number 0650 REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG stated his belief that the sponsor's intention was to focus on making people responsible for their actions. Notwithstanding whatever position a person takes on abortion, he believes that the large majority of Alaskans do not agree with subsidizing abortion procedures because of the sensitivity of the issue. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG referred to testimony about people seeking abortions being transported out of state or to other locales, such as from rural to urban areas. He suggested there is a gross amount of abuse in this area and that many of these instances may occur just for the personal desires of people to get a trip somewhere. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG indicated he agreed with Representative Porter about the history of this issue. However, he is disturbed about abuse of the system and respects the sponsor's position. He himself had offered the amendments to try to "change the color of this old nag, to make it a much better bill and to protect the rights of women in this state, and their right to constitutional privacy." Those amendments were based on what he thinks the federal law is. While he had some philosophical problems with this bill, given his own position on the issue, he thinks there is a legitimate reason to curtail the state payment in some, but not all, instances. He said without the amendments, it was difficult to support moving the bill and he was in a quandary. Number 0793 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ suggested in the next session trying to figure out ways to reduce the incidence of unwanted or untenable pregnancies instead. REPRESENTATIVE ROKEBERG made a motion to move HB 234 from committee with individual recommendations and the accompanying fiscal note. REPRESENTATIVE CROFT objected. CHAIRMAN GREEN requested a roll call vote. Voting to move HB 234 from committee were Representatives Bunde, Rokeberg, James and Green. Voting against it were Representatives Porter, Croft and Berkowitz. Therefore, HB 234 moved from the House Judiciary Standing Committee by a vote of 4 to 3.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|